for ffff...
'How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.'
---Adam Smith.
Now, it seems like there's a fairly old perspective that maintains we can reduce all motivations for human behaviour down to one, all-encompassing principle and that this principle is self-interest (or what Smith calls 'self-love' in TMS). So, two critiques follow: one, related to the narrowing down of the scope of our understanding of humanity; and, secondly, critiques of self-interest as the sole or dominating idea of modern culture.
A word of caution: modern economic theory doesn't actually have much to say on what our interests are or ought to be. In fact, as long as they are neatly ordered then the theory (axiomatic utility theory) is okay. It is only that economists typically add the assumption that agents have self-interested preferences. That was Edgeworth's 'first principle'.
Second word of caution: Even here it seems many of the political economists-Edgeworth himself, for example- never maintained, a la Gary Becker, that self-interest could explain all human behaviour. Exchange, trade and war. So, how and why anything is produced in the economy is not, according to them, something that could so easily be explained by individual self-interest (this is not surprising given the predominance of class perspectives in the old political economy tradition). Also, it was widely understood that we need institutions, trust, honesty (non-market factors) for market transactions to be sustained.
Why, historically speaking, did self-interest come to take up the position it did in our social imaginary? Hirschman suggests that self-interest was thought to offer a more orderly way of organizing society (as compared to one based on passions or a collective view of the common good. Understandably, perhaps, after the wars of religion the very notion of diversity and conflict had to be taken as a starting point for political theory). So, to borrow a line from Foucault, not very difficult to understand how the interest of the state could translate into the reason of the state. The passions were far too disorderly and unreliable; perhaps too extreme as well. Cold calculation has its advantages. For one, it allows one to see beyond the current moment and in a culture which has given up on the idea of 'cosmos' or teleology this may be crucial...
But what of sympathy, commitment, duty, kindness, compassion and empathy? could these all said to be mere veiled forms of self-interest? Does the self-interest theory become tautological and, relatedly, does it even count as a theory if there are no competing causal factors? Can it be refuted by evidence or is it an axiom? Does self-interest (as expressed in market transactions) lead to a reduction in these other values (are they "crowded out"?)
Just to take up one of these questions...
There is now growing evidence from the behavioural economists that individuals are actually not self-interested. This evidence comes in the form of games-such as the Ultimatum Game or the Public Goods Game. What is typically seen is that individuals do express a desire to co-operate or help another person even if it is not in their interest do so. So, for example, in the Ultimatum Game individuals do share some of the 'pie' with others even though, strictly speaking, in a one-off game (one which isn't repeated) it would make "sense" for them to take all of it for themselves if given the option.
Economists are increasingly aware of 'other motivations' or what S. Bowles calls "strong reciprocity". In the standard economics paradigm you only help someone if you expect them to help you in the future or if you gain some status benefits from doing so. Either way, it's in your self-interest to do so. And if it's not, then you won't help them and shouldn't. Simple. But under "strong reciprocity" you will still help someone even if you're never going to see that person in the future. In that sense it is "irrational" (if we couple rationality with self-interest). You might just be repaying kindness with kindness or you might be committed to helping someone in need even if it means you have to sacrifice your own interests. In short, the self-interest theory says something about what it is to be human and how we relate to other people.
Where does Smith fit into this? Well, he was obviously a pluralist and was quite vociferous about the damage done to our thinking by reducing sympathy to self-love.
"What's in it for me?"
There's a terrible cynicism attached to the standard economic view of motivation. If it's in your interest to cheat/default, then you should. One can't but help feel that part of the problem is the starting definition of 'the individual': closed in on himself, autonomous, always seeking to "maximize, invariably in conflict with other people and nature. I think Augustine would have called it a lonely kind of freedom...

6 comments:
fff is now pondering these moral sentiments ...
so each individual is in fact entitled to put sympathy, commitment, duty, kindness, compassion and empathy in his or her utility function - but those inputs were too messy to model?
anyway, this post will require some more pondering (this year & next).....
best,
fff
no, fff...not put in the utility function! not all values are 'preferences' and not everything can be 'modeled' in that way. commitment, for example, can often mean going against one's self-interest (what Sen calls a counter-preferential choice).
I think part of the appeal of economics was, as you say, the ability to keep the models simple. but it sacrificed understanding for precision; partly, though, it was also that a world run by few, predictable motivating factors would be more ordered, less prone to erratic swings. it is no wonder states took a liking to this idea: reason of state (foucault).
have you ever wondered why Robinson Crusoe is central to exchange? Mary Douglas's Missing Persons is excellent on this.
Keep well,
b.
well, I just read the chapter "self-interest, sympathy and commitment" in Sen's "The Idea of Justice" - "Rationality and other people" so I'm (almost) on the same page now!
Theoretic economists (grudgingly?)allowing RCT to accomodate "sympathy" is one thing, but financial analysts allowing businesses to pursue something else than profit maximisation is still another...
your Robinson Crusoe remark is very intriguing indeed.... will have to check that out
did I already wish you all the best for 2013?
yes, you did. thanks!
:-))
and to you, too, fff...just in case I forgot.
actually, john kay's got a new book out ('oblique') which suggests that some of the best companies do not just pursue profit.
on the sympathy bit I think Sen would say it-adam smith's notion of it-is more like his 'commitment' in 'Rational Fools' in the sense that it isn't so much about feelings or, rather, something that can be reduced to feelings. In one of his papers Sen goes even further and says that we might not even always be driven to pursue our own goals. As before, one gets the impression that the root problem is the notion of 'self' in self-interest.
If you get the chance, Griswold has a beautiful chapter on sympathy in his book on Adam smith.
Take care,
b.
(all this reminds me too of an Arendt-ian expression : "enlarged mentality")
but perhaps we do need to pitch "morals" vs "self" --- a moral imperative to respect other people's goals?
Ah, John Kay - he also published a lengthy report with recommendations to stimulate good stewardship and to reduce short-termism by investors/asset managers - it got much praise but little effective following (for now)
in any case - thanks for all the suggested reading!
In fact, wouldn't you consider writing a book about this whole 'self-interest' thing?
Yes, i think that's right but it's not just about respecting them ..sometimes it can be sharing them as well...a line that Arendt quotes: volo ut sis (Augustine)
What would it mean, today, to talk about our 'common good'? In a way that stays clear of the horrors of Communism and the often-narrow and claustrophobic 'community'? ...a space that Etzioni calls 'I-we'. What was Arendt's 'in-between-ness'again?
I am actually trying to write a book fff...'ethics and economics'. Struggling to find the time to be honest-and a part of me says the time would be better spent reading some fiction. But no, if I get a sabbatical this year that is something I would love to pursue.
anyways..enough about me.
Take care,
b.
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